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LAICITE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
PANEL DISCUSSION
DEGIROLAMI: Good afternoon. It's a pleasure to welcome you
all back to the second of our panels, "Laicit6 in
Comparative Perspective." Let me take a moment
to introduce the three panelists that we are
fortunate to have. First is Professor Nina Crimm,
St. John's University School of Law; second will be
Professor Javier Martinez-Torr6n of Universidad
Complutense de Madrid; and third up will be
Professor Elisabeth Zoller of Universit6 Panth6on
Assas, visiting at Maurer School of Law (Indiana
University-Bloomington).
We will follow the format from earlier today. Each
panelist will speak for between fifteen and twenty
minutes, after which we will open it up to
questions from the floor.
So with that, Professor Crimm, please get us
started.
CRIMM:

Thank you for including me in this conference.
In preparing for this panel on "LaYcit6 in
Comparative Perspective," I was struck at how
fitting it is to be here in Paris to share some
comparative perspectives on France's and the
United States' religious freedom principles and
policies and their application to government aid to
religion. In particular my focus today is on such
aid in the form of tax accommodations. In spite of
quite disparate political histories, different
religious and cultural traditions, and an ocean
dividing the two countries, the national
legislatures of the two republics only weeks apart
in 1789 approved legal texts containing the
strongest guarantees of freedom of religion on
101
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either side of the Atlantic. The French National
Assembly adopted the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen and the first U.S.
Congress approved what became the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Both documents guaranteed freedom of religious
conscience, but unlike the First Amendment,
the French Declaration did not guarantee
nonestablishment of religion. As I will discuss, the
laws of France over time evolved to essentially
disestablish religion. The initial distinctions in the
two countries' approaches were reflected in the
political governance structure of each country,
which through the years has impacted the manner
of national governmental financial aid to religion,
exhibiting increasing
similarities and yet
sustaining differences.
The strength of the guarantees of religious freedom
and the close time frames of the First Amendment
and the French Declaration were not entirely
coincidental. Thomas Jefferson was connected to
each. Jefferson, who had authored the 1786
Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,
was the United States Minister Plenipotentiary in
Paris from 1785 through the summer of 1789.
Jefferson is reported to have advised the Marquis
de Lafayette on specific provisions of Lafayette's
drafts of the French Declaration. From Paris,
Jefferson contemporaneously corresponded with
James Madison, the principal architect of the First
Amendment, and other congressmen about
supplementing the U.S. Constitution with a Bill of
Rights and including a strong guarantee of
religious freedom.
Yet, despite the Jeffersonian connection, as well as
the profound Judeo-Christian influences of the
same philosophical writings of Baruch Spinoza,
John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Baron de
Montesquieu on the framers of the two documents,
the principles and language regarding political
power and religion embodied in them stand in
contrast to one another. They also are different
from the legal frameworks and ideologies at the
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core of other European church-state relationships,
including those based on separation-such as in
Holland, Ireland, and Turkey-systems based on
separation along with aspects of cooperation with
religion-such as Germany, Austria, Belgium,
Spain, Portugal, and Italy-and mixed systems of
states with official churches-such as England,
Scotland, and Sweden.
The religious histories of these various nations
differ and are significant in their formulations of
church-state relations. But today my focus is
purely on the United States and France. So, I'll
begin with a brief discussion of the relevant
historical legal documents of the United States and
France. Then I will discuss their core principles,
comparing their modern-day applications in the
context of government aid to religion in the forms
of tax-related benefits.
Colonial America was a rich conglomeration of
settlers from the Old World. Virtually all colonists
were Christians and the overwhelming majority
were Protestants. But, colonial America was a
frontier for those religious minorities, including
and others,
Jews, Catholics, Mennonites,
considered dissenters and heretics in the Old
World. Religion was an essential foundation of
personal morals and also was connected
inextricably with civil government in those colonies
having an officially established church, all
Protestant and none the Roman Catholic Church.
As disestablishment took hold in the states, eleven
of the thirteen state constitutions contained some
type of religious liberty protections when the U.S.
Constitution was ratified in 1788. But the U.S.
Constitution itself had been written without
protections of states' rights and individual
liberties, including religious freedom, and many
Anti-Federalists exerted pressure to set forth such
safeguards. This agitation led to our Bill of Rights.
The First Amendment's Religion Clauses provide,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
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establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
As a general matter, the
exercise thereof."'
prohibits government from
Clause
Establishment
aid[ing] all religions, or
religion,
"aid[ing] one
prefer[ring] one religion over another."2 Excessive
government entanglement with religion poses the
danger of "advancing or inhibiting religion" by
endorsing or placing "an imprimatur on one
religion, or on religion as such, or to favor [any]
sect or religious organization."3 Some suggest that
the Establishment Clause demands strict
separation of church and state, but over time the
Supreme Court has held that it generally
"mandates governmental neutrality [and equality
or evenhandedness] between religion and religion,
and between religion and nonreligion."' The Free
Exercise Clause aims to guarantee freedom of
religious conscience and belief, as well as conduct,
both of individuals and religious institutions. So,
as a foundational matter, those clauses are
understood as governing church-state relations and
their formulation was intended generally as
limitations on the federal government's powers.
And, as of the 1940s, the Religion Clauses were
understood to also limit the powers of states.
The unique history of the struggles between, and
relationships of, the Catholic Church and French
monarchs and other political officials undergirds
France's approach to church-state relations.
Briefly, Roman Catholicism dominated the
religious life of France as early as the late fifth
century when it was part of Gaul. Despite the
strong roots that Protestantism had established in
France by the mid-sixteenth century, the French
government remained closely connected with the
Catholic Church into the nineteenth century. In
the interim, many religious battles interrupted the
general pattern of Catholic religious dominance.

'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
3 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
4 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
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After the French Revolution, Catholicism was
favored only sporadically by several monarchs, but
even that favoritism lasted only a short time.
The legal framework constructed immediately after
the French Revolution set up two modes of
thinking about religion, which led to great
tensions. First, the French Declaration established
the right of each individual to follow his or her own
religious conscience in private while governing the
expression of religion manifest in the public
sphere. In particular, article 10 provided that "No
one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions,
including his religious views, provided their
manifestation does not disturb the public order
established by law."' Second, it intended a strong
state, while maintaining the importance of a
national, public religion. In other words, within a
Gallican paradigm, the Catholic Church was
recognized as part of the "public order."6 Thus,
non-establishment of religion was not mandated,
and there was no right to form associations that
the State would recognize officially.
As the years progressed, tensions escalated
between the French Republic and the Catholic
Church, whose clergy demanded varying levels of
These
political, moral, and social authority.
mounting strains sparked further propagation of
secularization. The importance placed on state
protections for individuals' private exercise of
religious faith and conscience or their non-religious
convictions intensified. At the same time, the state
officially recognized religions within the public
order to include not only Roman Catholicism, but
also Calvinism, Lutheranism, and Judaism,
thereby expunging distinctions between these
organized religions.

I Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen [Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen] art. 10 (1789) (Fr.).
6 See JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON'T LIKE HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE
STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE 22 (2007).
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Laicit further materialized as a unifying concept
without formally being employed as a term in new
laws. That would wait until adoption of the French
Constitution of 1958. In the intervening years,
Parliament passed the Law of 1901, which formally
provided the right of citizens to form officially
recognized associations, and the Law of 1905,
entitled the "Law on Separation of Churches and
State," which has assumed a stature similar to
that of the First Amendment. The latter law
provides measures intended to implement
church-state separation, including the revocation
of recognition
of Catholicism,
Calvinism,
Lutheranism, and Judaism as official religions. It
also reaffirms the guarantees of religious
conscience in the French Declaration by providing,
"The Republic ensures the liberty of conscience. It
guarantees the free exercise of religion, under
restrictions prescribed by the interest in public
Together the laws of 1901 and 1905
order."'
implemented a redefined vision of religions as part
of civil society. Now, approximately one hundred
years later than in America, disestablishment took
place in France.
So let's turn to how these similar principles in the
U.S. and France as applied in the contexts of tax
accommodations.
Briefly, let's return historically to the American
colonies. As a practical matter, only established
churches, as state agents, were not taxed by civil
authorities in the American colonies. Because
dissenting churches were considered private
organizations, not state agents, local legislation
generally did not exempt them from taxation. So,
taxes were collected from dissenting churches were
distributed to a colony's established church, as
As the
were taxes collected from colonists.
a
however,
began,
War
Revolutionary
7 Loi du 9 d6cembre 1905 concernant la s6paration des lglises et de l'ltat [Law
Concerning the Separation of the Churches and the State] art. 1 (enacted Dec. 9,
1905) (Fr.) [hereinafter Law of 19051, translatedat www.concordatwatch.eu/showkb.
php?orgid=867&kb headerid=849&kb+id=1525.
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disestablishment movement accelerated.
exemptions
challenged
movement
ecclesiastical taxes for church properties.

The
from

After the Revolutionary War, disestablishment
spread among the states. Jefferson and James
governmental
opposed
rigorously
Madison
In order to protect
subsidization of religion.
religion as a purely spiritual matter for individuals
and to safeguard against a governmental
establishment of religion, they were proponents of
placing taxation in support of religion and religious
teachings beyond the reach of state and federal
legislatures. Perhaps Madison's influence on the
design of the U.S. Constitution can be seen in its
Article I conferral on Congress of authority to tax
all secular and religious entities.
Despite this constitutional authority, as early as
the Civil War, Congress imposed an income tax
only on corporations that had shareholders,
presumably to reach solely those entities perceived
as profiting their wealthy investors. Based solely
on their institutional structures and lack of profit
motive, houses of worship and other religious
organizations, along with educational and
charitable nonprofits, were not subject to that tax.
By 1875, our country had experienced significant
Catholic immigration and anti-Catholic sentiments
had grown. Catholic institutions were purported to
have accumulated substantial wealth and power,
which disturbed President Ulysses Grant. He
of
House
the
of
Speaker
supported
Representatives, James G. Blaine, in an
unsuccessful bid to pressure Congress into
amending the Constitution to expressly prohibit
the use of public funds for private parochial schools
and other religious institutions, and to proscribe
tax exemptions for religious organizations. As time
moved forward and the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution was ratified in 1913, Congress
was empowered to impose income taxes on all
entities, including religious organizations. But
Congress continued to follow its Civil War income
tax approach of exempting religious organizations
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(along with some secular nonprofits) from taxation.
That same year, it enacted what is now section
501(c)(3) of our federal tax code ("Internal Revenue
Code" or "I.R.C."), which also exempts seven
categories of secular organizations.
Tellingly, Congress has never justified the tax
exemption for religious organizations on the basis
of religion per se, that is, as a result of their
religious nature, function, or activities, nor on
grounds of the First Amendment. As the U.S.
became a social welfare state, the explanation
always has been grounded in the economics of
religious organizations not having income to tax
after providing social welfare services to the public,
services which also alleviate some governmental
burdens. So, the U.S. has an entrenched tax
exemption for houses of worship and other
religious entities, even though Supreme Court
precedent suggests that, within certain limitations,
an exemption from taxation is not compelled, but is
permitted, by the First Amendment.
The Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") is charged
with initially determining whether an organization
qualifies for distinct tax treatment because it is a
"religious" entity or, more specifically, a "church."
But as a special tax accommodation, houses of
worship are presumed automatically to be taxexempt under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) without filing
an application with the I.R.S., 8 although by
refraining from filing an application their
donors are not assured a contribution deduction
under I.R.C. section 170. Where such a religious
institution does file an application or its
entitlement to tax-exempt status is later
challenged, the I.R.S. relies on a fourteen-category
family resemblance test for determining whether
the entity is a "church." Nonetheless, the I.R.S.
generally has taken a position that "in the absence
of a clear showing that the beliefs or doctrines
under consideration are not sincerely held by those
' I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A) (2006).
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professing or claiming them as a religion, the
Service cannot question the 'religious' nature of
those beliefs,"' because too much searching could
result in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Consequently, groups such as Scientologists and
Jehovah's Witnesses, treated by some European
countries as cults, are treated as religions for tax
purposes in the United States. Furthermore, once
a religious organization is defined as a "church,"
such houses of worship uniquely are presumed
automatic tax-exempt status without filing an
application with the I.R.S.'o
In 1917, to spur giving to section 501(c)(3) religious
and secular entities, Congress added section 170 to
our tax code, which permits contributors to claim
an income tax deduction for donations to these
Pursuant to Supreme Court
organizations.
precedent, gifts deductible under section 170 are
limited to "unrequited payments," that is, those for
which the transferor receives no measurable
benefit in return and thus denotes some altruistic
or donative intent. Year after year, donors give the
largest proportion of their contributions to
religious entities and not to secular section
501(c)(3) organizations.
Finally, as a general matter, the Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of tax exemptions
for religious organizations while acknowledging
they are functionally and economically the
equivalent of direct government grants or economic
subsidies.' Because of this functional equivalence,

9 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977) (finding that witchcraft
qualified as a religion); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,827 (Mar. 23, 1982)
(citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
10 I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A). The caveat for a house of worship refraining from filing
an application is that their donors are not assured of entitlement to the I.R.C.
section 170 contribution deduction.
11 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (property tax
exemption); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989). Nonetheless, as
Justice William Brennan noted in his concurrence Walz, there may be a distinction
between a tax exemption and a subsidy for purposes of constitutional analysis of the
propriety of the exemption or subsidy itself. Walz, 397 U.S. at 690-91 (Brennan, J.,
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in turning now to France, I will discuss not only
tax matters but also certain grants beneficial to
religion.
The Law of 1901 formally provided the right of
official association status. So, post-enactment,
although associations in France can be freely
formed, only those secular and religious
associations approved by the State are entitled to
legal personhood, which permits ownership of real
property and the receipt of cash legacies.
This State approval and various attributes of aid to
religion appear ostensibly incongruent with article
2 of the Law of 1905, which provides, "The
Republic does not recognize, finance, or subsidize
any religious group."12 Indeed, the Bureau of
Religious Affairs (Bureau des Cultes), a division of
the powerful French Ministry of the Interior, is
charged specifically with substantively reviewing
the purposes and activities of groups claiming to be
an organized religion. It alone determines whether
a group qualifies specifically as an organized
religion, as opposed to a cult, and whether it
deserves treatment as a religious association.
There currently are two categories of associations
of State approved organized religions: first,
associations diocdsaines, or Catholic associations,
and second, associations cultuelles, which include
Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim associations.
The Bureau's determination can affect the tax
benefits a group receives under tax laws.
Associations cultuelles and associationsdiocdsaines
have been accorded tax-exemption on cash
donations received. By contrast, the Bureau has
not recognized the Jehovah's Witnesses as an
organized religion and considers that group to be a
cult. So, after the French tax authorities recently
levied taxes amounting to millions of euros on the
group's receipt of cash contributions, the group
concurring). This point was later echoed by Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, in Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 Law of 1905, supra note 7, art. 2.
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brought a lawsuit, claiming the levying of the tax
inappropriate. The Court of cassation, France's
highest civil court, agreeing with the lower courts,
ruled that the tax authority had the power to
impose the tax even though it had never previously
been imposed on other religious organizations. 3
None of the courts commented on whether, under
the French Constitution, the tax violated any
rights of the group to practice their religion or
whether the tax had been levied in a
discriminatory manner.
In addition to the tax-exemption for associations
cultuelles and associationsdiocsaines, other forms

of State and local government aid to religion might
appear in conflict with article 2 of the Law of 1905.
Nonetheless, other portions of that same Law
actually allow for such financial support. Pursuant
to articles 2 and 3, the State nationalized the
existing buildings of the former recognized
religions. Thus, those cathedrals, churches, and
synagogues, schools, abbeys, monasteries, and
other structures built before adoption of the Law
became property of the State, and the State turned
over many of those buildings, other than
cathedrals, to municipal governments.14
Yet,
under article 13 of the Law of 1905 the State may
permit-and it does permit-the Catholic Church
(or other previously official religion) the use of the

Cour de cassation, Oct. 5, 2004, Bull. civ. IV, No. 178, at 58 nn.95-96
(imposition of the sixty percent tax amounted to $20 million).
14 Parenthetically, when the Law of 1905 was adopted, the Alsace-Moselle region
in eastern France was under German occupation, and the treatment of this region
would remain under the German model. This was a remnant of the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870-1871. After World War I, the region was reunited with France, but in
an agreement, the Law of 1905 would not be applied to the Alsace-Moselle region.
This agreement would differentiate the treatment of religious buildings and
activities; their management would remain under the German model. Also, because
the prohibition in the Law of 1905 on financing or subsidizing religion does not
apply, the constraints that I now proceed to discuss regarding aid to religious
institutions throughout the rest of France do not apply in Alsace-Moselle. CE, Apr.
6, 2001, No. 219,379 (Fr.) (upholding this practice and affirming that state support
for religious education in Alsace-Moselle does not violate the principle of
secularism).
13
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nationalized religious buildings."s Interestingly, in
an attempt to equalize or neutralize the treatment
of Islam after an influx of Muslims, in 1920,
Parliament voted to spend 500,000 French francs
to construct the Grand Mosque of Paris, and the
city of Paris donated the land. At least under
general U.S. tax law principles, the Catholic
Church's, Islamic, or other organized religion's use
of these buildings at below fair market value, if
untaxed, would be considered essentially the
functional equivalent of a beneficial income tax
exemption.
Finally, similar to the U.S. contribution deduction,
France provides to donors, up to five percent
of their taxable income, a "tax credit" of
forty percent of the amounts contributed to
approved associations cultuelles and associations
diocdsaines.
Nonetheless, in contrast to
Americans, French citizens' philanthropic giving is
reported to be quite low, including to religious
institutions, presumably partly due to the deeprooted secularist culture.
It is clear from these short portraits that the
different political, religious, and cultural histories
of the United States and France significantly have
influenced in nuanced ways how their guarantees
of religious freedoms were formulated and
implemented. Despite the two countries' sharing
the value of strongly guaranteeing religious
liberties, the countries' approaches have been quite
distinct.
Laicit6 assumes a strong State, as
opposed to religious governance in political and
cultural matters, which the French historian Jean
Baub~rot describes as "Nation, constitution, [and]

'6 Moreover, pursuant to article 19 of the Law of 1905, the Catholic Church is
not responsible for financing repairs and restoration of those buildings. That
responsibility is the State's, although its funding may be supplemented by
collections from religious groups, tourists (such as in the case of the Cathedral of
Notre Dame) and others. These provisions apparently have not been challenged in
French courts.
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law, became 'sacred things.' "16 By comparison, the
U.S. Supreme Court has described the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses as limiting
government so that it cannot excessively interfere
with religion. Despite these contrasting policies,
when we compare the countries in 1789 as a
starting point with their contemporary places in
the context of government financially supporting
religion through tax and grant benefits, it appears
that while they maintain distinct characteristics,
they have moved toward more parallel positions,
prominently sharing some aligned features.
DEGIROLAMI: Thank you, Professor
Martinez-Torr6n.

Crimm.

Professor

MARTINEZ-TORRON: Let me first thank Mark Movsesian,
Dean Simons, and all of the organizers of this
event for providing me the opportunity and the
honor to be here. Also, thanks to the rest of the
people at St. John's University for their hospitality.
My purpose here is to talk about a Spanish
example which is related to a subject which is
emerging in this meeting in different shapes-and
for me, that subject is very important-and that is
the conception, and the limits, of state neutrality
when regulating the public sphere. I would say
that the Spanish example demonstrates an
effective way to ruin a good idea through a bad
practice. That's how I would describe the Spanish
situation.
The good idea was education for democratic
citizenship as a school subject. We had "civic
education" in the past in Spanish schools, under
Franco's regime. Nobody paid much attention to it,
fortunately, but we did have it, in theory, for many
years. This subject disappeared long ago from our
education system but reemerged in 2006, following,
16 IAN BURUMA, TAMING THE GODS: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY ON THREE
CONTINENTS 111 (2010) (citing JEAN BAUBlROT, HISTOIRE DE LA LAICITi EN FRANCE

(2000)).
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apparently, a recommendation by the Council of
Europe that both private and public school
curricula should encompass "education for
democratic citizenship."n This recommendation
was, to a large extent, responding to the rapid and
huge enlargement of the Council of Europe to the
countries of Eastern Europe, which lacked a truly
and well established democratic tradition. The
Council was also responding to increasing Muslim
immigration in many European countries. The
idea was, in short, to try to identify European civic
values and to educate the youth as to these values.
Currently the Spanish law requires that this school
subject, which is known as "education for
citizenship," must be introduced in all public and
private school curricula for pre-university
education-elementary, secondary, and high
school. The main statute and its subsequent
regulations went into effect in 2006."
It is
interesting to note that, even before the law was
actually implemented, it generated a very strong
and contrary reaction in Spanish society. As of
today, approximately eighty-thousand families

" Recommendation Rec (2002) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on Education for Democratic Citizenship (Adopted by the Committee of
Ministers on 16 October 2002, 812th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies), available
at
https:I/wcd.coe.int/wcdNiewDocjsp?id=313139&Site=CM&BackColorlnternet=
C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDBO21&BackColorLogged=F5D383.
18 The new school subject was introduced by the Organic Law on Education,
Organic Law 2/2006, 3 May 2006 (B.O.E. 5 May 2006). In Spain, the name of
"organic laws," leyes orgdnicas, is given to some statutes of particular significance
that must be approved by absolute majority in the Parliament (Cortes). The 2006
Organic Law on Education was developed by some subsequent regulations, in
particular the Royal Decree 1513/2006, 7 December 2006, with respect to primary
education (B.O.E. 2006), the Royal Decree 1631/2006, 29 December 2006, with
respect to secondary education (B.O.E. 2007) and the Royal Decree 1467/2007, 2
November 2007, with respect to baccalaureat (B.O.E. 2007).
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have signed a written statement in opposition to
this new subject.' Which were the reasons of this
remarkable social reaction against the law?20
Sometimes, the reaction against the new
curriculum has been presented as a sort of ultra
right-wing opposition to educating youth in
democratic values. No doubt, some of the people
opposing the curriculum may be of this orientation,
but the huge bulk of the opposition has nothing
to do with ultra conservative people. Rather, it has
to do with parents who understand that the
law, and its implementation, has gone far beyond
the purposes of the Council of Europe's
recommendations. In other words, the reason of
this social reaction is not a disagreement with
education on human rights and civic values like
respect, equality, solidarity, tolerance, et cetera.
The actual reason is the clear understanding that
some aspects of the new subject, as developed in its
curriculum, were interfering with the rights of
parents to decide the philosophical and religious
An
orientation of their children's education.
for conscientious objections are
19 It is difficult to obtain precise figures,
normally alleged at the local level. Let me add that the number of eighty-thousand
families probably means much more in Spain than, for instance, in France, where
there is a long tradition of brave spirit of protestation against public authorities.
Many Spaniards are still reluctant, out of fear, to put their name in writing to
express opposition to a particular governmental project.
20 Among Spanish legal literature on this new school subject and the conflicts of
conscience that it has created in a number of parents, see the critical studies of
Mercedes Serrano P~rez, La Objeci6n de Conciencia a Educaci6n para la
Ciudadaniaen el Marco Constitucionalde la Libertad Ideoldgica, REVISTA GENERAL
DE DERECHO CANONICO Y DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO, May 2010; Angel
L6pez-Sidro, La Objeci6n de Conciencia a la Educaci6n para la Ciudadaniaante los
Tribunales Superiores de Justicia, REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO CANONICO Y
DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO, May 2008; Lourdes Ruano Espina, Objeci6n de
Conciencia a la Educaci6n para la Ciudadania, REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO
CANONICO Y DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO, May 2008; Carmen Garcimartin,
Neutralidady Escuela Pdblica: A Prop6sito de la Educaci6n para la Ciudadania,
REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO CANONICO Y DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO,
May 2007; Jos6 Maria Marti SAnchez, La 'Educaci6npara la Ciudadania' en el
Sistema de la Ley Orgdnica de Educaci6n, REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO
CANONICO Y DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO, Feb. 2006. From a very different
perspective, in total support of the government's proposal, see Dionisio Llamazares,
Educaci6n para la Ciudadania,Laicidad y Enseiianza de la Religi6n, 6 LAICIDAD Y
LIBERTADES: ESRITOS JURIDICOS 219 (2006).
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interference that sometimes is derived from the
program itself and other times from practical
abuses in its implementation in some schools.
Which aspects are these? On the one hand, a
percentage of the recommended content of the new
curriculum, and sometimes the mandated content,
has to do with-and I'm quoting almost literally
the words used by the Spanish regulations-the
world of emotions, feelings of people, human
relationships, the world of human affectivity, the
need to construe a critical and autonomous
conscience, as well as other issues related to
human sexuality, different family models,
reproductive health, sexual orientation, et cetera.
The mere presence of these contents was
considered by many parents, and by some religious
communities-very clearly the Catholic Church,
but other religious communities in the country as
well-as implying a risk, in practice, of
transmitting moral views at school that were in
contradiction with the moral views of the parents,
and therefore with their right to guarantee the
education of their children according to their
religious or philosophical convictions. In other
words, the subject "education for citizenship," as it
was conceived, created the risk of moral
indoctrination of young students in Spanish
schools, against the Spanish Constitution 2 ' and
against the well-established case law of the
European Court of Human Rights-especially
Kjeldsen, in 1976, and Folger0 and Zengin, in
2007.22 According to the people opposing the law,

this risk would not be only a consequence of the
door that the program of the new subject opened
for practical abuses. It was also the consequence of
a certain trivialization of subjects with a very
important moral dimension under the guise of
"objective and scientific treatment"-ignoring the

21

CONSTITUCION [C.E.] art. 27 (Spain).

See Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen & Pedersen v. Denmark, 7 Dec. 1976 (Apps. No.
5095/71, 5920/72 & 5926/72); Folger0 v. Norway, 29 June 2007 (App. No. 15472/02);
Zengin v. Turkey, 9 Oct. 2007 (App. No. 1448/04).
22
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moral dimension of subjects as, for instance,
"sexuality" or "the world of emotions" entails in
itself a certain moral indoctrination.
On the other hand, there was another part of the
curriculum that was considered to be offensive for
the parents' rights, and not just because of the risk
of potential abuses but rather because the mere
itself
contents was
description of some
For example, the curriculum
inappropriate.
described human rights and democratic values as
the "ultimate and maximum source of morality."
These are strong words to be taught at school. One
thing is to say that, in the public sphere, or in the
civil society, we agree on certain common values
that are our point of reference in organizing social
or civic life, and a different thing is to teach the
students what the ultimate and maximum source
of morality is for themselves as persons-not as
citizens, but as persons. Here, there is some
confusion between what constitutes the private
sphere and what constitutes the public sphere in
the life on individuals. States can teach values
that are valid for the public sphere but cannot
teach what we must or must not believe in our
private sphere, for this is something that belongs
to the exclusive realm of each individual's choice
and is protected by the freedom of religion or belief
(it is the realm of what the European Court of
Human Rights has called the forum internum, on
which no limitation can be imposed by the State).
The irony is that a curriculum that was supposed
to transmit commonly shared civic values has
created a strong social divide and an awkward
situation in Spanish education. And allow me to
reiterate that the negative reaction generated by
the new school subject has not been impelled by
ultra-conservative forces, but by parents who are
very concerned about the fact that their children
could be indoctrinated with moral views that,
respectable as they may be, are in strong
disagreement with their beliefs. In other words,
the reaction against "education for citizenship," as
it has been designed, is caused by the fact that the
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State-and this would be my main point in this
presentation-is invading aspects of education that
should be reserved to the realm of the family. This
is not purely speculation or conjecture. It was very
revealing, for example, that some of the wellknown authors of the content of the new school
subject actually preached the need for a
"reeducation of the morals of Spanish youth." That
is, again, a very strongly worded statement. It
oversteps, in my opinion, the State's role with
regard to education.
In the short time that "education for citizenship"
has been implemented, there has been a number of
practical abuses with a various degree of
Most of them involve the
significance.
trivialization of issues that, for many people, have
an important moral dimension. The mere fact that
these issues are presented in class as not having
any moral dimension is a type of moral
indoctrination of the youth. We have had also a
few gross abuses-fortunately not many. Allow me
to be a little specific on this. When masturbation
techniques are taught in class, under the subject of
education for citizenship, this has nothing to do
with democratic citizenship at all. When a teacher
invites eleven year old students to experiment with
their bodies and with the bodies of their
classmates, of both sexes, and then to discuss in
public their reactions and emotions-what has it to
do with democratic citizenship? Other times, the
students have been asked to explain in public their
religion, their beliefs, their sexual orientation. All
this reveals that there is much confusion about
what education for citizenship means in the
European context-or much deliberate misuse of
the subject as a tool for "moral engineering." In
any event, quite a few teachers have actually
overstepped the margins of what could be
reasonably understood as civic education.
These gross abuses, together with other less gross,
but still important abuses, have persuaded the
opponents to the introduction of the new school
subject that they were right in their analysis of the
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flaws of the government's project and in their
predictions about what could happen in practice. I
should add that the implementation of education
for citizenship has been very dependent on each
region's authorities. Competence on education is
mostly decentralized in Spain. In some regions,
especially those governed by the Socialist Party,
the authorities have often acted in a lenient
way with respect to practical abuses. This has
led many parents to declare themselves as
conscientious objectors on behalf of their childrenconscientious objection has therefore been a sort of
last resource to prevent the moral indoctrination of
their children. And this fact has led to a different
type of abuse. In many schools, students whose
parents objected to the curriculum have been
publicly stigmatized and identified as ultra
conservatives or not good citizens. Sometimes lists
with the objector students' names have been
published at the school. These are terrible things,
especially at certain levels of education. This is
certainly not an ideal scenario and explains what I
affirmed at the beginning of my presentation-that
"education for citizenship" in Spain can be taken as
a counter-example, an example of how to ruin a
good idea.
As could be expected, the new school subject has
led to frequent litigation in Spanish courts.
Currently, there are approximately three-hundred
cases pending in different Spanish jurisdictions.
Sometimes, this litigation arises from practical
abuses. Other times it is the legal framework itself
what has been challenged in the courts-and I
would like to focus on this latter approach. The
argument is that the legal framework of "education
for citizenship" contains so many deficiencies that
it permits and facilitates school administrators and
teachers to distort this type of education, so that
abuses can easily happen. In other words, the
legal framework itself, and not only the practical
implementation of the school subject, is the
problem. Plaintiffs have relied on article 2 of the
First Protocol to the European Convention, which
provides that the State must respect the right of
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parents to ensure that the education and teaching
that their children receive is in conformity with
their own religious and philosophical convictions,2 3
and on the equivalent language in the Spanish
Constitution, which is even more protective of
parents' rights.2 4
The Spanish Supreme Court issued some
significant decisions on these claims in 2009.25 It is
not my intention to summarize here these
decisions but four points are worth mentioning-in
addition to pointing out the fact that these
decisions were taken by a strongly divided court.
First, the court declared that conscientious
objection was not a permissible way to respond to
potential abuses. The position of the court was,
basically, that neither the students nor their
parents had the right to opt out unless it
were specifically granted by legislation. I think
this is a wrong interpretation of the Spanish
Constitution and the case law of the Spanish
Constitutional Court on conscientious objectionthe Constitutional Court held in 1985, with the
occasion of a case regarding abortion, that the right
of conscientious objection derived from the
fundamental right to religious freedom and could
be exercised directly, irrespective of legislative
recognition in specific cases. On the other hand, as
many scholars commenting on this decision have
observed, the Supreme Court's position may prove
to be impracticable. If the only way parents have
to avoid the indoctrination of their children in
school is to challenge directly the legislation or its
regulations in court-or actual, concrete abuses by
teachers-that will take time.
Should their
children suffer this indoctrination in their
23 Protocol
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
24CONSTITUCION [C.E.] art. 27, para. 3 (Spain).
25 See STS 340/2009 (recurso no. 948/2008), Feb. 11, 2008; STS
341/2009
(recurso no. 1013/2008), Feb. 11, 2008; STS 342/2009 (recurso no. 905/2008), Mar. 4,
2008. For a detailed account and a critical view of these decisions, see Lourdes
Ruano Espina, Las Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo de 11 Febrero 2009 Sobre
Objeci6n de Conciencia a EpC, REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO CANONICO Y

DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO, May 2009.
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education for years, until they finally obtain a just
solution from the courts? It is certainly difficult to
accept the idea of experimenting with children's
education.
Second, the Supreme Court declared that two
important decisions from the European Court,
Folger0 v. Norway, in 2007, and Zengin v. Turkey,
also in 2007, were not applicable to the issue of
Spanish law on civic education. You are probably
familiar with these decisions. Very briefly, in
these cases, some families successfully challenged
systems of religious education in their respective
countries; these systems were supposed to be
neutral but in practice they were not. The Spanish
Supreme Court affirmed that Folger0 and Zengin
did not apply because they related to religious
instruction, not civic education.
I was astonished when I read this in the court's
opinion, because the Folger0 and Zengin decisions
explicitly affirm-following the European Court's
doctrine established in Kjeldsen-that the
protection of the parents' rights granted by article
2 of the First Protocol to the European Convention
applies to all subjects of education and school
curricula-indeed, it applies to the entire setting of
the school. Actually, article 2 was used in 1983 in
Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, a
European Court's decision relating to physical
punishment in public schools in Scotland-the
court recognized the parents' right to refuse that
type of punishment for their children.2 ' The main
reason I can see for the Supreme Court's statement
is that Folger0 and Zengin implicitly affirmed that,
when you have a legal framework for a specific
type of education with a high moral profile, and
that framework can lead to practical abuses that
amount to indoctrination of students, there should
be an expeditious way to deal with this problem in
practice, in particular the recognition of a right to
opt out-the lack of practicable ways to opt out was
" Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, 25 Feb. 1982 (Apps. No. 7511/76 &
7743/76).

122

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 49:101

one of the reasons why the European Court
declared that the Norwegian and Turkish
programs of religious instruction, which had the
appearance of not being completely neutral, were
in violation of parents' rights under article 2 of the
First Protocol. This is something that the Supreme
Court of Spain was probably not prepared to
accept.
The third point I would like to mention is that the
Spanish Supreme Court specifically said-and I
find it very reasonable-that the State may
promote ethical values that are implicit in or
derived from human rights and basic constitutional
principles. This is, no doubt, a sort of moral
indoctrination by the State, because human rights
and certain constitutional principles are clearly
based on moral values. When, for example, we
preach equality of legal treatment for all
individuals, irrespective of their religion, race, sex,
national origin, et cetera, we derive that principle
from a particular moral conception of human
beings, namely the equal moral dignity of human
The State can-and probably mustbeings.
promote the teaching of these values in school,
although the State cannot require internal
adherence to those values, or base students' grades
in these subjects on students' internal adherence.
Students should have total freedom of choice with
respect to what they believe or not believe. And
parents should be free to indoctrinate their
children in values different from those values that
the State thought were grounded in, or derived
from, "human rights and constitutional values."
This is part of what the European Court has called
the forum internum, an aspect of religious freedom
that the State has no power to limit.
The fourth point is that the Supreme Court took an
interpretive approach to the law and regulations
on "education for citizenship." The court found
that the deficiencies of some legal provisions could
lead to practical abuses, but, instead of declaring
them void, explained what the right interpretation
of these provisions was. Many scholars have
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criticized this approach of the court. In Spanish
practice, the Constitutional Court has sometimes
adopted this type of interpretive approach-when a
vague statute or a statutory provision may lead to
unconstitutional practices or consequences, instead
of declaring it directly unconstitutional, the court
has affirmed that the relevant statute or
statutory provision is constitutional exclusively
when interpreted in a specific way; any other
interpretation would be unconstitutional. It is
unclear if the Supreme Court can also adopt this
interpretive approach. The Supreme Court is the
highest court within the ordinary judiciary, while
the Constitutional Court is a totally different
thing-it is the supreme interpreter of our
Constitution.
Leaving aside the Supreme Court's decisions in
2009, there have been other criticisms with respect
to the government's attitude in the design and
development of this new school subject, and with
respect to the training of teachers that should
implement it. We may understand these criticisms
better in the light of a very interesting document,
prepared by a group of OSCE experts, which
contains guiding principles for neutral teaching
about religion or belief in public schools. 27 Among
other things, this document explains that, in
order to establish a system of neutral religious
instruction in public schools-which is a very
difficult thing to do-it is important to set up an
inclusive procedure to guarantee the actual
neutrality of teaching and avoid the indoctrination
of students. A detailed and careful process of
dialogue with civic society should be followed.
Nothing like this was done by the Spanish
government, neither in the preparation nor in the
implementation of the law. Indeed, the sharp
division of society on this subject has been of no
27 See OSCE/ODIHR ADVISORY COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION
OR BELIEF, TOLEDO GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON TEACHING ABOUT RELIGIONS AND
BELIEFS (2007), httpi/www.osce.org/publicationsfodihr/2007/11/28314_993_en.pdf.
This document deals with the difficulties of this type of religious education and
contains detailed recommendations to make it efficient and actually neutral.
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concern to the government. That, I believe, was a
grave mistake. When you see that something that
is supposed to build citizenship is in fact doing the
opposite, you should be asking yourself, have we
In my opinion, the
done something wrong?
government should have dealt with the real
problem and initiated an open dialogue with the
stakeholders that are entitled to have a say on this
matter. In addition, the government refused to
accept the mere possibility of including any
provision for opt-out rights as a way of dealing
with practical abuses and protecting students from
something
is
teachers-this
by
excesses
particularly relevant in a mandatory school subject
that has many moral implications and whose real
Finally, the
neutrality raises many doubts.
government did not establish an appropriate
procedure to guarantee the qualification and
training of teachers of these subjects, which are
essential in subjects like this.
I wish I could be more specific in these points but I
am already out of time. Allow me just to mention
briefly what are, in my view, the two most
significant issues that the case of education of
citizenship in Spain has raised.
First, which are the limits of the state's moral
indoctrination of the youth? We have this principle
in the case law from Strasbourg: the State
educational system may not indoctrinate students
against the parents' wishes. But, at the same time,
it seems logical that the state can require the
teaching of civic values that are embedded in
human rights and in fundamental constitutional
values. This is, in my view, a sort of moral
teaching-that is, indoctrination-and a very
legitimate one, irrespective of whether parents
agree or not. However, the State can never go
beyond that-it can never require internal
adherence to those moral values, because freedom
to believe, and freedom to choose the subject of our
own beliefs, is absolute.
Second, is it really possible to deal at school, from a
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purely scientific and objective perspective, with
certain subjects that may have many and profound
moral implications-such as, for instance, civic
education, religious education, et cetera? In my
opinion it is possible; difficult but possible.
However, real objectivity requires that teachers
point out that those subjects, for many people,
have a very important moral dimension, and in
this moral dimension it is not for the State to
supplant the role and competences of the family.
Therefore, teachers must remark, with all clarity,
that it is not for the State to say anything on the
moral component of those issues, for this belongs to
the realm of personal choice. Teaching those
subjects without pointing out their moral
dimension would not be objective. The mere fact of
ignoring their moral dimension .would be a
trivialization that would entail a moral
moral
indoctrination,
indoctrination-passive
perhaps, but still moral indoctrination. All this
shows that this sort of teaching requires a very
high professional and moral qualification in
teachers, which takes time and is not easy to
achieve. Neither improvisation nor haste are good
companions on this trip.
This has been the case of "education for
citizenship" in Spain. It is an interesting but very
difficult project. Ignoring the difficulties has been
probably the reason why the effect has been, until
now, the opposite of what the authors of this
educational project declared-social division
instead of social cohesion around certain civic
values.
Thank you.
you,
DEGIROLAMI: Thank
Professor Zoller.
ZOLLER:

Professor

Martfnez-Torr6n.

Good afternoon. First of all, I would like to thank
Professor Movsesian for having invited me to this
panel, and also Professor DeGirolami for giving us
such good directions as to what we should talk
about this afternoon. My understanding is that we
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should talk about lalcit6 in a comparative
perspective, right? So, this is what I intend to do,
but from a very modest viewpoint.
My presentation will deal with the following
question: what is the place of laicit6 in the debate
on President Sarkozy's proposal to ban the full
veil? How do we relate laicit6 to the ban on the full
veil in the French Republic? I will focus mostly on
a very interesting, very rich, comprehensive study
of the subject by the Conseil d'Etat. Let me start
by giving you the context of that report, the Conseil
d'Etat being, as you know, a crucial institution in
the French Republic.
Last January, the French Prime Minister
requested an advisory opinion from the Conseil
d'Etat on a possible ban of the full facial veil. In
his letter of mission, the Prime Minister said that
the female garment known as the burqa, or niqab,
was "at odds with the Republican conception of life
in society" and raised the question of "whether
there are possible legal grounds for preventing
social practices of this kind in a democratic
society." The Conseil d'Etat's advisory opinion,
titled "Study of Possible Legal Grounds for
Banning the Full Veil," held that "no incontestable
legal basis can be relied upon in support of a ban
on wearing the full veil as such."2 8 In other words,
there is no solid legal ground for a total prohibition
of all facial masks, whatever they may be,
including a complete mask of the face, such as the
nijab. Unless an undisputable legal ground for the
ban could be found, a ban of the full veil would be
unlawful.
Among the various possible legal grounds for the
ban, the Conseil d'Etat considered laicit6-see, in

CONSEIL D'ETAT, STUDY OF POSSIBLE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR BANNING THE
FULL VEIL 19 (2010) [hereinafter CE STUDY], available at http://www.conseil28

etat.fr/cde/medialdocument/RAPPORT%20ETUDES/etude voile integral-anglais.
pdf.
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particular, pages 17-18 in its opinion. 9 These two

pages give witness to important changes in the
French approach to laicit6. This is the point I will
comment upon from a comparative perspective.
My main argument is that the Conseil d'Etat, in a
few sentences, has brought lalcit, the French
version of secularism, very close to the conception
of religious freedom as enshrined in the First
Amendment. It has changed the nature as well as
the effects of the traditional French principle.
The key passage in the Study by the Conseil d'Etat
is at page 17. I will give the French quote and
then provide the official English translation:
"Mme si le port du voile int6gral peut 6tre regard6
par ceux qui s'y livrent comme ayant une
connotation ou une finalit6 religieuse, il ressort des
travaux mends par la mission de l'Assembl6e
nationale sur la pratique du port du voile integral
que la question des justifications religieuses de
cette tenue ne fait pas l'objet d'un consensus."30
Which means, in English: "Even if the full veil is
regarded by those who wear it as having a religious
connotation or purpose, it has emerged from
investigations by the parliamentary mission into
the practice of wearing the full veil that there is no
consensus
on its religious significance.
Concretely, if wearing the full veil may usually be
regarded as motivated by religious reasons,
in practice we are unsure that religion is always
the sole motive for wearing it. For example,
conscientiousness in one's appearance could
explain wearing the full veil. Some women may
think that being completely hidden behind a black
veil makes them look more mysterious, therefore
more attractive, more desirable, and sexier. And,
therefore, the Conseil d'Etat goes on, laicit6 cannot
be retained as a legal foundation for a total ban.
D'ETAT, ETUDE RELATIVE AUX POSSIBILITiS JURIDIQUES
2 CONSEIL
DINTERDICTION DU PORT DU VOILE INT1IGRA 17-18 (2010) [hereinafter CE ETUDE],
available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/media/document/avis/etude-vi30032010.
pdf.
30 CE ETUDE, supra note 29, at 17.
31 CE STUDY, supra note 28, at 19-20.
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What does that statement mean? It means that
wearing the veil is no longer the expression of a
religious creed, but rather the expression of an
opinion. The full veil is speech, symbolic speech.
Its legality should therefore be governed by
freedom of speech, not by freedom of religion. If
the full veil is just speech, the principle of laicit6
indeed becomes irrelevant.
This is a major change in the approach to lalcit6,
insofar as it implies that religious practices are to
be accepted in the public sphere as long as they
may be regarded as speech. But that is precisely
what laicit6 precludes or, more exactly, what it
In the traditional French
used to preclude.
is not just speech; it is
religion
to
laicit6,
approach
regime. And that
special
to
a
religion and subject
I would like to
that
point
second
brings us to the
The position
length.
at
more
develop here a little
in the
change
a
implies
of the Conseil d'tat
consequences of laicit6.
According to the Conseil d'Etat, "Le principe de
laicitW impose ainsi la stricte neutralit6 de l'Etat et
des collectivit6s publiques vis-h-vis des pratiques
religieuses."32 Because of the adjective, "stricte,"
neutrality of the State means that the State must
be indifferent to religious practices; it must pay no
attention to religious outfits and respect religious
freedom, which is not severable from freedom to
speak one's mind. Freedom of conscience goes
hand in hand with freedom of expression. Both
freedoms are protected by the French Constitution
and the European Convention of Human Rights.
It follows from this approach to neutrality that the
Conseil d'Etat has adopted a mild or soft version of
laicit6, a noncombative approach that brings that
concept closer to the American concept of religious
French exceptionalism in religious
freedom.
32 CE ETUDE, supra note 29, at 18 (emphasis added). The English version reads:
"The principle of secularism thus requires a strictly neutral attitude on the part of
the state and public authorities towards the practitioners of a religion and vice
versa." CE STUDY, supra note 28, at 20.
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matters is dead; laicit6 is no longer dramatized and
Religious freedom is the rule and
amplified.
religion may be expressed freely in the public
sphere. Separation between church and state does
not mean or, rather, no longer means, banning all
religious expressions from the public domain. This
is precisely what the United States Supreme Court
recently held in Salazar v. Buono: "The goal of
avoiding governmental endorsement does not
require eradication of all religious symbols in the
public realm."33
When is the State entitled not to be neutral? The
Conseil d'Etat mentions two situations: first, when
the functioning of the service public-the public
administration-is at stake, which is the case, for
instance, with the 2004 statute prohibiting head
scarves for little girls at schools; it is an exception
justified by the context; and, second, when the
religious practice or speech implies "non
compliance with the common rules governing the
relations between public communities and private
individuals." Here, the Conseil d'etat relies on the
decision by the Conseil Constitutionnel.84 Save for
the narrow exception regarding the functioning of
the public service, the Conseil d'Etat's position is
very close to that of the United States Supreme
Court in Employment Division v. Smith: a religious

practice may not go against and a fortiori breach 35a
"valid and neutral law of general applicability."
And that's all.
Such is the case with religious practices
or principles that go against the principles of the
But that is not germane to the
Civil code.
French Republic. With respect to some Islamic
particular-the
in
sharia,
principles-the
European Court of Human Rights said, in the case
of Refah Partisi (dealing with Turkey), "It is
difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and
3

Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010).

34

CC decision no. 2004-505DC, Nov. 19, 2004, Rec. 173, para. 18.

3 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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human rights while at the same time supporting a
regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges
from Convention values, particularly with regard
to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules
on the legal status of women and the way it
intervenes in all spheres of private and public life
in accordance with religious precepts." 6
So, where does that bring us? It brings us to this.
Laicit6 cannot provide legal foundation for a total
prohibition against the display of any religious
beliefs in the public space and, therefore, could not
justify a total ban of full facial veils in the public
space. Laicit6 comes into play in the relations
between public persons and religions only, and it
may not be imposed on the civil society save within
the context of some public administrations-as is
the case with public schools.
I would even go so far as to say this. Laicit6 is no
longer viewed as a civil religion that could replace
religious values. The tone was set on December 20,
2007, when President Sarkozy said that "the school
master will never replace the priest or the pastor,"
because, in his opinion, "he [the schoolmaster] will
always miss the experience of sacrificing his own
life and lack that charisma which flows from a
commitment carried by hope."3 President Sarkozy
elaborated on positive laicit6 and negative laicit6,
explaining that the former should replace the
latter.
The Study of the Conseil d'Etat goes in that
direction. Laicit as a fighting device against
Catholicism is no longer necessary; it has fulfilled
its historic mission, which was to put an end to
Catholicism as the dominant religion in social life
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 44 (2003).
Allocution de M. le Prisidentde la Rdpublique Frangaise,PRSIDENCE DE LA
RPUBLIQUE, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.elysee.fr/presidentlles-actualites/discours/
2007/allocution-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique.7012.html?search=Latran).
The
official French version reads: "[L]'instituteur ne pourra jamais remplacer le cur6 ou
le pasteur... , parce qu'il lui manquera toujours la radicalith du sacrifice de sa vie
et le charisme d'un engagement port6 par l'espirance." Id.
3
3
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and to replace it with republican values. That does
not mean that the burqa will not be banned on
French territory. The bill may go forward and be
eventually adopted. But laicit6 is not likely to be
its legal foundation. It will be, maybe, the dignity
of women, or, maybe-this would be my positioncitizenship. But it will no longer be laicitU. And
that is a major development in the evolution of
that
quintessentially
French
constitutional
principle."
Thank you very much.
DEGIROLAMI: Thank you very much, Professor Zoller. We
have some time now for questions and answers. If
you would just signal to me that you have a
question, I will put you in our queue. And maybe I
will exercise the moderator's privilege of asking the
first question, which is to Professor Zoller. Just
the last thing that you said, Professor Zoller, that
citizenship ought to be the legal ground for the ban
of the burqa. Would your position then entail that
the ban shouldn't be effective for noncitizens?
ZOLLER:

Foreigners? In theory, they should be entitled to
wear the burqa. This is my position, my personal
position, and it has, of course, no legal weight other
than my opinion, that's all. We do not tell
foreigners the way to dress. This would be absurd.
But, French citizens, yes. Yes, we could. Or, to put
it better, we should.
Citizenship is a very meaningful value.
The
traditional French approach to citizenship,
particularly among constitutional lawyers, is to
reduce it to the right to vote. I think that it is
much more than that. I must confess that my
position is strongly influenced by American case

38 On October 7, 2010, the Constitutional Council handed down its decision in
the so-called integral veil case. CC decision no. 2010-613DC, Oct. 7, 2010, J.O.
18345. It validated the bill on several grounds, which are listed in the third
paragraph of its opinion. Most of them are drawn from the Declaration of 1789. One
is taken from the Preamble of 1946. Article 1 of the French Constitution of 1958,
which embodies the principle of laicit6, is conspicuously absent.
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law and the position of the Supreme Court on
citizenship in that wonderful case of Brown v.
Board of Education," which I find of profound

implication, profound importance on the meaning
Citizenship means to have
of citizenship.
relationships with each other. Just as a statute
cannot legitimately segregate people, as the Jim
Crow laws used to do, you cannot segregate
yourself from others. Sure, you can segregate
yourself by living at home, living in your
castle, and seeing nobody. And that is, absolutely,
But when you are
your fundamental right.
participating in social life, can you behave in a way
totally disconnected from other people?
Look, we have in the penal code the obligation to
save someone's life if it's in danger. But such an
outfit, I mean, the burqa, could preclude you from
fulfilling your civic duty. In French law, you have
the obligation to try to save a person who is
drowning, if it poses no danger to you, if it's
completely harmless. Suppose there is a pole right
there on the wharf and you see somebody
drowning. You must take the pole and hand it to
the person. If you do not save the person, you can
be punished under the penal law. This is a duty of
citizenship. That concept implies that people
cannot be segregated from one another. This is my
position.
DEGIROLAMI: Rosemary?
SALOMONE: Yes, Javier, your presentation resonated for me in
so many ways, in terms of looking at education for
democratic citizenship. I have a comment and a
question. There seems to be something ironic here.
I think you suggested that the parents are
invoking the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Is that what you said?

3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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MARTINEZ-TORRON: The European Convention on Human
Rights, article 2 of the First Protocol.

SALOMONE: Ah.
MARTINEZ-TORRON: It recognizes, in the context of the right
to education, that the parents have the right to
ensure the education of children in conformity with
their religious and philosophical convictions. The
wording of the Spanish Constitution looks a little
different. It includes this right, but it may go even
beyond that.
SALOMONE: In the United States, religious fundamentalists
have opposed U.S. ratification of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child for exactly
that same reason, that it would contravene their
rights to direct the education of their children.
And, for that reason, it's just us and Somalia who
have not ratified the U.N. Convention-and
Somalia has no government.
So, in terms of education for democratic
citizenship, it seems-I'm a little bit familiar with
the Council of Europe and their effort to develop a
sense of European citizenship. That's what I think
they're really trying to do. But it seems to me
that the Spanish program has a much more
comprehensive definition of citizenship. It's not as
comprehensive as the French definition, but far
more comprehensive than we would ordinarily
understand. Was there another agenda here?
MARTINEZ-TORRON: That's the fear of many people. And a
part of the problem is this idea that has been
described as "social or moral engineering"-the
allegedly
the
government-an
idea
that
"enlightened" government-can dictate to the
population what the population should believe with
regard to morals. Personally, I think that the
people behind this educational project actually
lacked the self-restraint that would have allowed
them to distinguish between, on the one hand, the
realm of public morals and citizenship, that is, the
realm of public life, and, on the other hand, a
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different dimension in which every person must
make his or her own choices. And, while children
are minors, those choices are made by parents. No
one can substitute families in that role. My
impression is that the actual intention of some of
these people was to replace the role of families
because they thought that families are wrong with
regard to how they educate their children-so they
could be thinking: we are going to educate their
children instead of them "in the right way." This is
the fear, I would say, of most of the families behind
the opposition to the project. And some of the
opposition has to do with the fact that a
substantial part of the curriculum would be totally
unnecessary from the perspective of the Council of
Those subjects
Europe recommendations.
shouldn't be in the curriculum. But once they are
in the curriculum, because they have a moral
dimension, the alternative is this: either that
moral dimension is treated by teachers with
extreme care or there is indoctrination of the youth
beyond the state's legitimate competence.
SALOMONE: They go so far beyond the Council of Europe
recommendations, but they were presented as a
response to the recommendations.
MARTINEZ-TORRON: Right.
DEGIROLAMI: Okay, thanks very much. Next up is Nathalie.
CARON:

Thank you. Thank you to all presenters for their
Elisabeth, your paper was a nice
papers.
complement, I found, to what I said about the three
different approaches to laicit6 today: positive
lafcit6 on the one hand, laicitg en mouvement, on
the other hand, and lacitd de combat, by the more
militant. And you indeed said that the Conseil
d'ttat has a noncombative approach to the
problem.
However, Jean Baub6rot, the historian of laicit6,
who is a proponent of laicitg en mouvement, is also

against the ban on the burqa, and he is not close to
President Sarkozy. So, when you say that French
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exceptionalism is a thing of the past in terms of
laicit6, that laicit6 is no longer combative and that
we have something which is close to President
Sarkozy's way of looking at things, well, I wonder if
you're not overlooking this other approach,
defended by people like Baub6rot and others
who are against the ban on the burqa without
necessarily being in favor of positive laicit6 the way
President Sarkozy sees it. Do you know what I'm
saying?
ZOLLER:

Yeah, absolutely. The advisory opinion by the
Conseil d'Etat is extremely important because of
the place of the Conseil d'Atat as an institution
and what it represents and the way it works. And
we know that what it does is usually carefully
combed and screened and studied and discussed
and debated, so we can be sure that all arguments
have been weighed with great care, including
probably laiciti en mouvement.

CARON:

Can I have a follow-up question?

DEGIROLAMI: You may.
CARON:

You said, Elisabeth-and this is also a reaction to
what Rosemary said.
About the 2004 law,
Elisabeth reminded us that it was about girls being
prevented from wearing the veil. But, again, the
law is not about the veil. It's about conspicuous
religious signs. It's also about crosses and also
about the kippah, right? And Rosemary, earlier
on, said that the reasons for the ban on the veil
had nothing to do with public safety. You said
something like that. And what I wanted to bring
up here is the issue of anti-Semitism. We haven't
mentioned it yet today, but I wonder if-well, this
is something which we don't talk about a lot in
France because there is some kind of taboo here
about this. But I remember when we had this big
debate over the veil in 2003 and 2004, there was
this thing about the fact that in schools there
might be fights between kids, between Jews and
Arabs-and all Arabs here are expected to be
Muslims.
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So, I wonder how that plays out in the debate. We
don't talk about it, but maybe we should remember
that there is some anti-Semitism, again. That is
an issue here, isn't it? When you say that it has
nothing to do with public safety, I don't know,
maybe there was something there. We focused on
the veil, we focused on young girls and hijabs, but
we didn't say a word, or we said hardly a word,
about the kippah. But it was also about the
kippah.
SALOMONE: Perhaps I'm wrong, but the kippah issue preceded
the 1989 expulsion of the girls over the veil. I
So, that started
believe that was the case.
percolating before the veil issue even began.
ZOLLER:

Yeah, but the rationale of the 2004 statute, which
addresses, as you said, all religious artifacts or
devices, I mean, the cross, the kippah, the veil,
anything conspicuously visible.

SALOMONE: Turbans.
ZOLLER:

Turbans, yes, anything. The rationale for this is
that a young child has no capacity to choose freely
what he or she wants to believe. A young child
does not have what we call in French, libre-arbitre,
that is to say, the full ability to think as a rational
person. This is the key reason for the 2004 statute.
And in that sense, yes, it was supported by
lalcit6-yes, in that sense. It's a statute that was
definitely supported by lalcitd, on the ground that,
until a certain age, we are not sure that the person
has really chosen to wear that religious artifact, or
garment, or whatever.

SALOMONE: Well, can I just make a quick response to thatDEGIROLAMI: Sure, sure.
SALOMONE: The assumption there, though, is that the parents
cannot make their choice for them. I mean, what
you're talking about the capacityZOLLER:

Absolutely.
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the child to make those independent
SALOMONE: -of
judgments. In U.S. culture, we would assume that
the parents haveLAYCOCK:

The parents, yeah.

SALOMONE: -the parents can make that choice.
LAYCOCK:

You could take the problem from a different
viewpoint and say, well, after all, the parents could
make the choice for the children just by sending
their children to the private schools.

DEGIROLAMI: Let me interject that we have a few more people
in the queue, as interesting as this discussion is.
Mark, you're next up.
MOVSESIAN: Thank you very much. I enjoyed all of the
presentations. I have two quick questions, one for
Elisabeth, one for Javier.
Elisabeth, I very much enjoyed your talk,
especially your relating laicitd specifically to
Catholicism. As an outsider reading the history,
that seems very much the case. Even the word
"laicitC" suggests a contrast with something"clericalism," maybe? The laity versus the Catholic
clergy, right? And I understand your point that
that particular fight is now over, largely. And yet,
people are still using the word "lalcitd" to talk
about other religions, too. And I wonder, is this an
instance of "the song is ended, but the melody
lingers on?" What explains the fact that people are
still talking this way about lalcit?
And, for Javier, I wonder about the nature of the
exit option in Spanish society. For example, in the
United States-and Doug knows more about these
cases than I do, I'm sure-most of the time,
parents who are upset about similar things in the
public schools lose, ultimately, and are told, "Well,
that's how it is; this is the public school." And,
oftentimes, they seek to exit. And, especially in
America, now, particularly among Evangelical
Christians, there is the concept of homeschooling,
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in which you just-you educate your kid at home.
There are certain exams that the kids have to take,
I believe, but they're educated by the family at
home. So, there is an exit option. And I wonder
what the nature of that is in Spanish society.
DEGIROLAMI: Maybe Elisabeth can go first.
ZOLLER:

I think you're right. It may bubble up a little more
in the public debate, but certainly not with the
same background and consequences as before. It
may also mean-this combative laicit-that
religion should be out of the public sphere. Maybe
that's what it means for certain people.
It's
certainly not the position of the Conseil d'IEtat.
Laicit6 also survives in the sense that it has
become very difficult to be indifferent to religion in
the public sphere. In that sense, yes, laicit6
survives.
Indifference-you know, "we don't
care"-is difficult, because of this history and this
fight against Catholicism as the dominant religion.
So, this is how I would explain it.

MARTfNEZ-TORRON: I thought that the main subjects that
have been raised in your country related to the
dispute between creationism and evolutionism. I
think there is a different story behind that dispute,
because of the social and religious context of the
dispute.
Also, when you teach science, it is
possible to stick to the facts that have been proved
by the state of science at a given time. You don't
need to make moral judgments. If you do, then you
are indoctrinating people. If some teachers do,
then you have every right to complain.
I think that the Spanish situation is different
because it relates directly to questions of morality.
It's not just that the program allows for isolated
abuses by a few teachers. It's that it creates an
atmosphere in which teachers can say whatever
they want and are entitled to replace the role of
parents in certain areas. For example, to put it
more clearly, some of the classes refer to the use
of contraceptives. You can trivialize that issue
because, for some people, it is a trivial thing. For
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some families, though, it is a serious thing. It
would be as if, one day, for the sake of self-defense,
teachers start explaining how to use a gun. If you
trivialize the use of a gun, you are touching a very
sensitive, moral dimension of human life. And, for
some families, the use of contraceptives is exactly
the same.
About the exit option, in Spain we don't have this
sort of easy alternative. In Spain, we have public
schools, which cover approximately two-thirds of
the entire education system, and private schools,
most run by Catholic institutions, that cover onethird. We don't have a homeschooling system.
And, actually, this is a very interesting subject,
because the issue has been raised by some families
in isolated parts of the country. We don't have any
tradition about homeschooling, though. It's not
forbidden, as it is in some European countries, but
it is not regulated, either. There is basically a void
in the legislation."0
But the presumption, I would say, is that
homeschooling is not permitted, and therefore the
alternative parents have is either to move the kid
to another school or to take the kid to a private
school.
Very often, this entails an economic
burden. Our system is not as generous as other
European systems with regard to the financing of
private education. It depends on the regions. Each
region makes its own choice about how and when
to fund private education. And the tricky part of it
is that private schools only receive approximately
half the money per student as public schools do.
Which means in practice, curiously, that a student
in a public school is worth double the student in a
private school. At the same time private schools
are prohibited from demanding additional money
from parents. It is certainly a bizarre situation.

40 In a recent decision, the Spanish Constitutional Court held that the legislator
is entitled both to legalize and illegalize home schooling without infringing the
constitutional rights of parents or the state's constitutional obligations in the realm
of education. See STC 133/2010, Dec. 2, 2010.
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DEGIROLAVII: Our last question of the day is from Brett
Scharffs.
SCHARFFS: My question is for Elisabeth. I agree with Nathalie
that your presentation was a really interesting
counterpart to hers. I wish you had been here this
morning, because I got very different impressions
of the social debate about laicit6 from your two
presentations. So, Nathalie, maybe I'm looking for
a response from you, as well.
Elisabeth, if I understood you correctly, you were
describing a situation in which laicit6, as a
singular conception, as a uniquely French
conception, was in a state of decline, in which the
concept had been domesticated. And, if I am
correct, I detected an air of sadness that laicit6 was
becoming a little bit more like the United States'
conceptions of religious freedomZOLLER:

Everybody knows here that I am a great friend of
the United States. Absolutely nothing to be sorry
about; on the contrary-

SCHARFFS: -Well,
be that as it may, from Nathalie's
presentation this morning, I got a little bit of a
different picture, that there was on the ascendance
a conception of laicit6 that was a little bit more
militant, a little bit more hard-line, a little bit
more, not just anticlerical, but antireligious, that
was a little bit more hostile to religion per se and
to Islam in particular. And I must say that, viewed
from outside, as a distant and not particularly
attentive observer, that sounds a little bit closer to
the truth. I mean, we see the 2004 law as one step
in the direction of trying to further displace
religion from public life and as an expression of, if
not Islamophobia, at least a certain view about
what the headscarf means as a symbol and who
gets to decide what it means as a symbol. And the
recent proposals in the Winter and Spring of this
year about the full ban, I think, are viewed by
many as a continuation of that trend, as the next
step down this same road. And that would be
viewed as a part of this reenergization of a
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muscular conception of laicit6, perhaps a
secularism rather than a secularity. And I would
perceive a further divergence of U.S. and French
conceptions.
I wish I could agree with your
description, but it feels quite the opposite of what
I'm sensing in the direction of the two debates.
ZOLLER:

I think the two laws, the currently pending bill and
the 2004 law, do not have common ground. They
are not the same thing, if only because the ban of
the full veil, or the full mask, actuallyinterestingly enough, they had to refer to a "mask"
and not a "veil," because otherwise it would have
been obvious that the bill discriminates against a
specific religion and is especially targeted against
one religious group. But article 1 of the French
Constitution says that the law cannot discriminate
among people on the basis of race, national origin,
and religion. We are exactly like in the United
States in that respect. In the 2004 law, no
religious group in particular is targeted. It is, in
fact, as Nathalie said. Absolutely no religion in
particular is targeted. All religions are covered.
In addition, the 2004 law defends the role of
the State as a public educator, and is consistent
with the philosophy of Condorcet and the
Enlightenment, that the first mission of public
education is to open minds, to give people the tools
to create themselves, to find by their own judgment
their place in the universe, not being taught by
external groups what they have to think. It is the
philosophy of giving people the capacity, without
any outside constraints, to make the choices that
they want. For me, maybe because I am so close to
the United States, I find that we have so much
more in common than you believe, so much more in
common. You know, when Justice Kennedy talks
about the right of every individual to have his or
her own conception of the mystery of life,' it's

41 For an illustration of the common inspiration
in Justice Kennedy's views, see,
for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992) ("the right to define one's own concept of existence"), and Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("autonomy of self").
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exactly the same thing in the French Republic,
exactly the same thing. The 2004 law is based on
that philosophy. Also, after all, the public schools
are the only place where we integrate young kids
from immigrant backgrounds. That is absolutely
crucial-and the Supreme Court had exactly the
same idea regarding the role of public schools in
the states, exactly the same philosophy. So, I
would not say that there is a continuum between
the 2004 statute and the current pending bill.
And, in fact, the Conseil d'tat, in its opinion on
laicit6, said it very clearly.
DEGIROLAMI: Nathalie, last word.
CARON:

Thank you. I agree with Elisabeth that we have
many points in common that we're not necessarily
aware of. So, that's one thing. And, to respond to
Brett, well, actually, the people I spoke about this
morning are reacting to what Elisabeth described,
this change in the interpretation of laicit6, and
they are worried about it. Among the other
examples I gave, I spoke about the Le Monde
Diplomatique. I think that these people in
particular, the people that I spoke about this
morning, are not necessarily in favor of the ban on
the burqa. They don't talk a lot about the burqa,
as I said, but I am not sure that they all favor the
ban on the burqa. We have to take the whole
political context into account. I don't know if you
realize, we have had a lot of new legislation in
France since President Sarkozy was elected. And
there is a reaction to the fact that, each time that
something goes wrong, we have a new law. And,
personally, I'm not sure I would like to see this law
passed. Because, okay, you forbid people from
wearing a burqa, are you then going to forbid what,
women from wearing miniskirts or, I don't know
what? So, I think we have to be careful.

DEGIROLAMI: Okay, great. Let's wrap it up there.

